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The 2007 Scottish Elections: 
A Dark Day for Participatory Democracy 
 




This article examines the political campaigns, electoral processes and results of the 2007 Scottish 
parliamentary election. The Scottish National Party’s narrow victory enabled it to form the first 
Scottish independence-seeking government, and heralded the end of five decades of Labour 
dominance of Scottish politics. However, the high number of rejected ballots raised questions about 
the legitimacy of the poll, as well as the effectiveness of the democratic process in Scotland.  
 
Introduction 
The Scottish Parliament election of May 2007, held during the anniversary of the 1707 Treaty of 
Union, produced the first Scottish government whose explicit mandate is to break up the United 
Kingdom. The Scottish National Party succeeded in doing what no other party in Scotland has 
achieved for over fifty years: stealing the Labour Party’s crown as the largest party north of the 
border. The SNP replaced Labour (and their LibDem coalition partners) not only in the devolved 
regional parliament, but also in dozens of local councils across the country. However, this historical 
result was overshadowed by problems surrounding the voting procedures. Almost 150,000 votes 
were rendered invalid, constituting the largest disenfranchisement of Scottish citizens since 
universal suffrage. This article chronicles the main themes, events and results of the elections, 
paying particular attention to the challenges of widening participation in the electoral process. 
 
The Political Context  
The third set of elections to the devolved Scottish Parliament took place on Thursday, 3 May 2007. 
Previous elections in 1999 and 2003 had each produced a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government. In both cases, the result was of little surprise. In 1999, Labour and the LibDems could 
claim to be the chief advocates of devolution, having led the Constitutional Convention in the 
1990s, and both parties had endorsed a pre-electoral coalition. In 2003, Labour’s record had been 
tarnished by minor scandals but the Executive had produced popular legislation which secured the 
incumbent government another term in office. The situation in 2007, however, was quite different. 
There was popular disenchantment with Scottish Labour and its perceived inability to represent the 
interests of the Scottish people on key reserved matters such as the treatment of asylum seekers on 
Scottish soil, and plans to extend nuclear facilities in Scotland. The Scottish electorate also 
appeared to be tiring of British Labour. ‘Blair’s war’ in Iraq was as deeply unpopular amongst the 
Scottish electorate as it was in the rest of the UK; cash for honours had undermined government 
integrity; and there was widespread concern over the pensions crisis. Although the Scottish 
Parliament had no control over these issues, they were still important election themes1. Opposition 
parties argued that they could better meet the needs of the Scottish people, and the Scottish National 
Party – which had articulated a ‘social democratic’ policy platform – was portrayed as the closest 
alternative to Labour in Scotland. Labour had won a plurality of votes in every election in Scotland 
since 1964, and the SNP’s main goal was to convince voters that it was time for change.  
 
Novelties in the Electoral Process  
The 2007 Scottish elections were the product of a number of experiments in election design. First, a 
new form of proportional representation (PR) was introduced for the local government elections. 
                                                 
1 Although the importance of these themes in determining voting behaviour has been questioned (see the results of the 
Scottish Election Study 2007 at http://www.scottishelectionstudy.org.uk/). 
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Under the Single Transferable Vote system, instead of electing one councillor with an ‘X’ on the 
ballot, voters choose their candidates in order of preference from ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’ and so on. This 
differed from the additional member system (AMS) used for Scottish Parliament elections. A 
second innovation was the re-design of the ballot paper following a Scotland Office consultation. 
The rationale behind placing the regional vote on the left-hand side and the constituency vote on the 
right-hand side of a single ballot paper was to remove ‘any confusion that a vote on the regional list 
is less important or a second choice’ (Scotland Office 2006). Third, Scottish electoral constituencies 
were reformed in 2005, creating fewer, and larger, constituencies that were no longer identical to 
those used for Westminster elections. Fourth, vote counting machines were introduced during the 
2007 elections in order to facilitate the faster production of results (Scotland Office 2006). And 
finally, it was decided that the Scottish Parliament and local government elections would be held on 
same day, with the rationale of increasing voter turnout to the local government elections. Coupling 
the two elections, however, went against the recommendations of the Arbuthnott Commission – an 
independent panel of experts that was set up to examine boundaries and voting systems in Scotland.  
 
The Party Campaigns 
As party competition in Scotland tends to take place on one side of the political spectrum, whereby 
six out of the seven main parties may be classified as ‘centre-left’ (Labour, SNP, Scottish Liberal 
Democrats, Scottish Greens, Scottish Socialist Party and Solidarity), party positions on welfare 
issues – such as health and education – often converge. This did not preclude some differences 
arising over the issues of local council tax, transport and business tax. Yet the main contest during 
the election was on a reserved matter: the future of the Union, with most media attention focused on 
the semi-polarised debates between the ‘Unionists’ (comprising Labour, the LibDems and the 
Conservatives) and the ‘Nationalists’ (the SNP, Greens, Socialists and SSP). 
 
Scottish Labour Party 
Due to Labour’s increasing unpopularity on both devolved and reserved issues, most opinion polls 
from November 2006 put them clearly behind the SNP (Bort 2007). This had the effect of placing 
the party on a defensive footing. Labour’s focus was on undermining the SNP and its goal of 
independence. More problematic was the disorganised way in which it planned the campaign. 
Campaigners found there were no records of canvass returns for Labour’s seats in previous 
elections, which put Labour seats at risk (Jones 2007: 8). Furthermore, Labour decided not to 
canvass properly in ‘safe’ areas, which had the effect of turning voters to other parties who made a 
greater effort to win their vote. Finally, as later acknowledged by party officials in a post-election 
review, this was one of Scottish Labour’s most negative election campaigns ever (The Herald, 6 
August 2007). Party rhetoric was peppered with references to ‘fear’, ‘divorce’ and ‘risks’ associated 
with independence. Labour refused to entertain the possibility of constitutional change within the 
boundaries of the Union, thus denying that devolution was a process. 
 
Scottish National Party (SNP) 
After the previous year’s poor poll ratings, the return of Alex Salmond to the party leadership 
resuscitated the Scottish National Party. In the lead-up to the election the SNP had garnered the 
support of a number of leading figures in Scottish civil society and the arts, a public endorsement 
from a former Bank of Scotland chairman and party donations from high-profile Scottish companies 
that enabled the SNP to mount a professional, wide-reaching campaign. The party had sought to 
reach out to large sections of society through its popular policies of halting hospital closures, 
abolishing the graduate endowment, and ending road-bridge tolls. This enabled the SNP to break 
out of its traditional grass-roots area in the North East into the central belt and previously safe 
Labour seats. Party activists canvassed across the country, and targeted mailings were employed to 
lure voters away from other parties in marginal seats (Jones 2007: 11). In contrast to its 2003 
election campaign, the central theme in 2007 was independence. The SNP’s promise to hold a 
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referendum on independence within its first year of office gave voters the chance to make a 
decision on the Scotland’s future at a later date. The SNP sought to portray itself as a government-
in-making, and the slogan ‘It’s time’ was flexible enough to mean many things to different voters: 
independence for Nationalists, or a change in government for those disillusioned with Labour. 
  
Scottish Liberal Democrats 
After eight years in coalition government with Labour, during which many key policies had been 
tabled or diluted, the Liberal Democrats embarked on the 2007 election campaign by declaring that 
they were not interested in entering another coalition. This allowed the party to disassociate itself 
from Labour, and to mount a positive election campaign with pledges to enhance opportunities for 
young people, build new local health centres and create youth justice boards. These policies were, 
however, largely lost in the furore over independence. One of the policies that did stand out – the 
abolition of the council tax and its replacement with a locally set income tax – received attention 
largely because of the SNP’s endorsement of this policy, leading to speculation about a potential 
Liberal Democrat-SNP coalition. However, post-election, the LibDems refused to engage in any 
negotiations with the SNP until the proposal for an independence referendum was shelved, even if it 
contained a number of different options including federalism. The LibDems’ rejection of a 
partnership with the SNP disappointed some voters who might otherwise have supported the party’s 
ambitions for a more powerful Scottish Parliament.  
 
Scottish Conservative & Unionist Party 
After their electoral wipe-out in Scotland during the 1997 general election, the Tories had been 
slowly trying to rebuild their credibility and Scottish identity north of the border. Under the new 
leadership of Annabel Goldie, the Tories sought to disentangle themselves from the constitutional 
question and instead sought to focus on ‘bread-and-butter issues’ in Scotland, such as law and order 
and economic development issues. The Tories were able to maintain this focus by removing 
themselves from the unionist-independence debate (which they did so by declaring that they had no 
formal commitment to expanding the parliament’s powers but would be open to debate), and by 
pre-empting any doubt as to their governing intentions by declaring that they would not enter a 
coalition with any party in Scotland. Instead, the Tories advocated the merits of minority 
government, which Goldie believed was more ‘democratic and accountable’ than coalition 
government (Sunday Herald, 5 March 2006).  
 
The Minor Parties 
The second session of the Scottish Parliament had produced a ‘rainbow parliament’, which included 
six Scottish Socialist Party MSPs and seven Scottish Green Party MSPs. This situation would not 
be repeated in 2007. The Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) had split the previous year following leader 
Tommy Sheridan’s libel case with the News of the World newspaper. The SSP and Sheridan’s new 
party – Solidarity – engaged in a contest of one-upmanship whereby one party would declare a 
policy goal, and the other would aim to better it, i.e. the SSP demanded an £8 minimum wage 
whilst Solidarity wanted £8.50. Such infighting destroyed Socialist support. The Scottish Greens 
had more reason to be hopeful. They had a comprehensive election manifesto that went far beyond 
ecological issues and dealt with public services delivery, taxation and crime. The problem was not 
so much the content of their policies, than their visibility. Media commentators called the election a 
‘two-horse race’ between Labour and the SNP, and treated it accordingly.  
 
The Results 
After a long delay, the final results of the Scottish Parliament elections were given at 6pm on 
Friday, 4 May 2007. The SNP had won the election by a single seat (see Table 1). Yet this was a far 
from straight-forward result. The final seats to be counted had been the Highland regional seats, and 
the first calculation gave Labour all four of the seats, putting them in first place. But following a 
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recalculation, at the behest of the SNP, it was found that the Nationalists had in fact taken two of 
the Highland regional seats, giving them an overall majority of one seat in the Parliament.  
 
Table 1: Summary of Seats by Party 1999-2007 
 Constituency MSPs 
  1999            2003           2007 
Regional List MSPs 
  1999          2003          2007 
Total MSPs elected 
 1999           2003          2007 
Scottish Labour 53 46 37 3 4 9 56 50 46 
SNP 7 9 21 28 18 26 35 27 47 
Scottish Lib Dems 12 13 11 5 4 5 17 17 16 
Scottish Cons 0 3 4 18 15 13 18 18 17 
Scottish Greens 0 0 0 1 7 2 1 7 2 
SSP 0 0 0 1 6 0 1 6 0 
Solidarity - - 0 - - 0 - - 0 
Source: Scottish Parliament Information Service (SPICe) 
  
The SNP had beaten Labour on three electoral measures. First, the Nationalists had overtaken 
Labour on the number of seats, winning 47 compared to Labour’s 46 seats. Second, they took a 
larger share of constituency votes, amounting to 32.9% compared to Labour’s 32.1%. And third, the 
SNP had outpolled Labour in its share of list votes: taking 31% to Labour’s 29.2% (see Table 2). 
The SNP had also made the largest gains on the previous election out of all the parties, winning 20 
seats more than in 2003 (Lynch 2007: 51).  
 
Table 2: Party Share of Constituency and Regional List Votes, 2007 















Scottish Labour 32.1 37 29.2 9 36.7 46 1,243,789 
SNP 32.9 21 31.0 26 36.4 47 1,297,838 
Scottish Lib Dems 16.2 11 11.3 5 12.4 16 556,883 
Scottish Cons 16.6 4 13.9 13 13.2 17 618,778 
Scottish Greens 0.1 0 4.0 2 1.6 2 85,548 
SSP 0.0 0 0.6 0 0.0 0 13,621 
Solidarity 0.0 0 1.5 0 0.0 0 31,096 
 98% 73 92.2% 55 99.2% 129 3,847,553 
Source: Scottish Parliament Information Service (SPICe) 
  
Yet although the SNP had beaten Labour in the election by a single seat in the parliament, and had 
successfully captured a number of Labour’s ‘safe’ seats including Cunningham North, Edinburgh 
East & Musselburgh, Stirling, and Govan, the Nationalists had not actually made a huge dent into 
Labour’s substantial support base. In fact, Labour’s constituency vote only fell by 2.4 points and its 
regional vote by 0.1 points compared to the 2003 election (see Table 3). Moreover, the Labour vote 
had declined less in 2007 than it had done in the 2003 election (from 1999 to 2003 it declined by 
4%, whilst from 2003 to 2007 it had fallen by 2.5%). Despite taking a smaller share of the 
constituency votes, at 32.1%, Labour had won more constituency seats than the SNP (see Table 2).  
 The Scottish LibDems had a rather uneven performance in the election. Although they had 
increased their share of the constituency vote, which at 16.2% was up 0.8 points on the 2003 
election, their support dropped in the regional list seats, down 0.5 points to 11.3% (see Table 2). 
Although their overall vote share increased, giving them 16 seats in the Scottish Parliament, they 
had dropped back to fourth place behind the SNP, Labour and the Conservatives. The latter had 
won 17 seats, despite their regional vote share having dropped 1.6% from 2003 – their lowest 
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nationwide vote ever. Given the Tories’ opposition to PR it is ironic that they were clearly 
benefiting from this, whilst the LibDems, PR’s greatest advocate, were unable to work the system 
to their advantage. Although there was no sign of the ‘Cameron effect’ north of the border, this was 
a respectable result for party which had ten years previously lost all its seats. 
 
 
Table 3: Changes in the Distribution of Votes and Seats 2003-7 







Won Total Seats 
Scottish Labour -2.4 -9 -0.1 +5 -4 
SNP +9.0 +12 +10.1 +8 +20 
Scottish LibDems +0.8 -2 -0.5 +1 -1 
Scottish Cons 0.0 +1 -1.6 -2 -1 
Scottish Greens +0.1 0 -2.9 -5 -5 
SSP -6.2 - -6.1 -6 -6 
Solidarity - - +1.5 0 0 
Sources: Scottish Parliament Information Centre (SPICe) and Denver (2007) 
 
 The figures in Table 3 show that the SNP’s electoral success came largely at the expense of 
regional list support for the Greens, the Socialists and the independents. The six SSP/Solidarity 
MSPs lost all their seats in Parliament. The SSP’s share of the regional vote fell to 0.6% and 
because it did not put forward any individual candidates, like the Greens and Solidarity, it received 
no share of the constituency vote. Solidarity received 1.5% of the regional vote but this was 
insufficient to elect a list candidate. The Scottish Greens fared relatively better. Its share of the vote 
had dropped from 7% in 2003 to 4% - which was just under the 5-6% required to elect a candidate 
via proportional representation. The party lost 5 of its MSPs, electing only two list candidates in 
2007. Margo MacDonald was the only independent candidate elected.  
Once the final results had been announced, preparations for the new government began. As 
the SNP had taken the biggest share, they were considered to have the ‘moral authority’ to form a 
government. As they lacked a plurality of votes in the Parliament, however, they sought to make 
coalition deals with the Liberal Democrats, the Greens and Margo MacDonald. Each refused in 
turn, though the Greens agreed to support the SNP on an issue-by-issue basis. As a result, the SNP 
formed the first minority government in Scotland, electing Alex Salmond as First Minister and his 
second-in-command, Nicola Sturgeon, as Deputy First Minister. Although minority government 
presents the SNP with challenges in implementing policy, Salmond stated in his acceptance speech 
that the most pressing task facing the government was to lay ‘bare the outrage of why 100,000 
Scots were denied their democratic voice’ (BBC News, 4 May 2007).  
 
The Ballot Fiasco 
To the astonishment of political commentators, the main election ‘story’ of the night was not the 
SNP’s gains over Labour. Rather, it was the astounding evidence that more than 100,000 votes cast 
had been disqualified, a figure that was later re-calculated to be 146,097 (Electoral Commission 
2007a). This figure constituted almost 4% of all votes cast in the election, though this figure varied 
in individual areas. The high number of rejected ballots was pervasive throughout Scotland. In the 
constituency vote, 85,643 ballots had been rejected, constituting 4.07% of the votes cast. As we can 
see from Table 4, this represented a huge increase on the 1999 and 2003 election figures. Moreover, 
the number of rejected votes was even greater than the successful candidate’s winning margin in 16 
Scottish constituencies, which questioned the legitimacy of the election outcome. For instance, if 
Labour had managed to maintain the constituency Cunningham North, which it had lost by only 48 
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votes (which was a smaller margin than the number of spoiled ballots), then Labour would have 
would have reversed final election result by being one seat ahead of the SNP.  
 
Table 4: Rejected Ballots on the Constituency Vote 









Central Scotland 293,326 10,877 3.71 0.67 0.33 
Glasgow 215.667 16,933 7.85 0.68 0.45 
Highlands & Islands 191,279 6,478 3.39 0.62 0.40 
Lothians 296,132 15,399 5.20 0.72 0.30 
Mid Scotland & Fife 279,684 8,443 3.02 0.57 0.26 
NE Scotland 265,592 9,128 3.44 0.61 0.28 
South of Scotland 284,810 9,031 3.17 0.57 0.35 
West of Scotland 276,141 9,354 3.39 0.66 0.33 
Scotland 2,102,631 85,643 4.07 0.64 0.33 
Source: Electoral Commission  
 
The voting debacle was met with condemnation by national and international observers. The 
US-based organisation ‘Fair Vote’, which had sent thirty experts to Scotland to monitor the 
electronic scanning machines, drew parallels with the ‘hanging chads’ problem in Florida during 
the 2000 presidential election. Executive Director Robert Richie called the ballot fiasco ‘totally 
unacceptable’ (Observer, 6 May 2007). Salmond argued that the decision to conduct STV and AMS 
elections on the same day as ‘deeply mistaken’ and promised to set up an independent judicial 
enquiry. Meanwhile, the independent Electoral Commission appointed Ron Gould, a Canadian 
elections expert, to conduct a review of the spoiled election ballots. His report concludes the 
exceptionally high number of rejected ballots can be attributed to the design of the ballot (Electoral 
Commission 2007b). The regional and constituency votes, which were placed on the same ballot 
paper, provoked confusion as they appeared to be a continuation of the same vote. This problem 
was compounded by the abbreviation of instructions on the Glasgow and Lothians ballots, which 
recorded the highest number of rejected ballots. Yet it was not only the layout of the ballot that was 
confusing: the contents were also complicated. Some parties put their leaders on the ballot without 
mentioning the party or adding the party symbol, such as ‘Alex Salmond for First Minister’. The 
Gould report recommended that this be avoided in future by placing names of parties first on 
regional ballot papers, and by producing separate constituency ballot papers for elections.    
 
The Participation Gap 
On election night, it became apparent that greatest problems were concentrated in the poorest parts 
of the country. Areas like Glasgow Shettleston, Maryhill, Pollok and Baillieston saw spoiled ballots 
run to over 10% of the total number of votes counted – almost three times higher than the national 
average. Carman and Mitchell (2007: 11) confirmed this in a statistical analysis of the pattern of 
rejected ballot papers, finding that ‘there is a glaring and distinct relationship between the relative 
level of social deprivation in a constituency and that constituency’s relative level of rejected 
ballots’. The socioeconomic background of the voter appeared to determine their ability to 
understand the confusing ballot paper. Constituencies like Glasgow Shettleston are also known for 
their consistently low turnout in elections, which reached only 38.0% in 2007, compared with 
59.4% in Dunbartonshire. Although overall turnout increased slightly during the 2007 elections to 
just under 52%, as Curtice (2007: 43) posits, ‘the participation gap in Scotland appears to have 
widened further’. The combination of low turnout and a high proportion of spoilt ballots meant that 
the most socially deprived areas were also the most disenfranchised.  
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Conclusion: Overcoming the Democratic Deficit 
The Scottish elections of 2007 have ushered in a new chapter in the history of Scottish politics. 
Within the first 100 days in office the new Scottish government released a white paper on an 
independence referendum entitled ‘Choosing Scotland’s Future: A National Conversation’ (Scottish 
Executive 2007). The SNP promised a more dynamic approach to intergovernmental relations in the 
UK, and a more lively debate on the constitutional future of Scotland. Yet before this issue can be 
tackled, the basic political needs and entitlements of the Scottish citizenry must be met. As Mitchell 
(2007) argues, Scotland’s democratic procedures have been ‘damaged’ by the ballot fiasco. The 
Gould report makes a number of specific recommendations to rectify voting problems. Yet 
widening political participation in Scotland’s democratic process also requires tackling Scotland’s 
socioeconomic problems, which is the only way to begin to remedy the democratic deficit in 
Scotland that was so shockingly exposed on 4 May 2007. 
 
References 
Bort, E. (2007) ‘Election 2007 – Devolution Come of Age?’ in G. Leydier (ed) La dévolution des  
pouvoirs à l’Écosse et au pays de Galles, 1966-1999 (Paris: Éditions Ellipses). 
Carman, C. and J. Mitchell (2007) Report. An Examination of Ballot Rejection in the Scottish  
Parliamentary Election of 2007 (Glasgow: Department of Government, University of 
Strathclyde). 
Curtice, J. (2007) ‘Turnout and Electoral Behaviour’ in S. Herbert, R. Burnside, M. Earle, T.  
Edwards, T. Foley and I. McIver (eds), Election 2007, SPICe briefing 8 May 2007, 07/21. 
Electoral Commission (2007a) ‘Rejected Ballots at the 3 May Scottish Parliamentary Elections’, 13  
June 2007. Available at: 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/templates/search/document.cfm.19604. 
Electoral Commission (2007b) ‘Independent review of the Scottish Parliamentary and local  
government elections 3 May 2007’. Available at: 
 http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/templates/search/document.cfm/20316.  
Jones, P. (2007) ‘The Smooth Wooing: The SNP’s Victory in the 2007 Scottish Parliament  
Elections 2007’, Scottish Affairs, No. 60, Summer 2007. 
Lynch, P. (2007) ‘Impact of the Election Result on the Parties’ in S. Herbert, R. Burnside, M. Earle,  
T. Edwards, T. Foley and I. McIver (eds), Election 2007, SPICe briefing 8 May 2007, 07/21. 
Mitchell, J. (2007) ‘The only loser was our democratic procedures’, The Herald, 5 May 2007. 
Scotland Office (2006) ‘E-Counting to be used in 2007 elections’, Press Release, 9 June. 
Scottish Executive (2007) Choosing Scotland’s Future: A National Conversation. Independence  
and Responsibility in the Modern World (Edinburgh: Scottish Executive) 
 
